At page 8 of the decision the Court held, on the subject of testimony by an Attorney that, “It must be made clear that an attorney wears the shoes of the donor and testifies as if he were the donor and not as a witness for the donor. Testifying for one’s self and testifying as a witness are two different things in law. One cannot be subsumed into the other. Indeed, as an attorney, the petitioner had every right to repeat the reliefs he is seeking from the court in his evidence in chief. A witness on the other hand, is generally concerned with conveying what first hand knowledge he has about the case and not the reliefs the petitioner or the party he is testifying for is claiming.”

Dissolution of the Marriage

On the substance of the petition, the Court noted that under section 1(2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), the sole ground for divorce is that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation, which a petitioner may establish through any of several specified facts, including unreasonable behaviour or an inability to reconcile differences after diligent effort. Although the petitioner had pleaded unreasonable behaviour, the Court found his evidence better supported the fact that diligent efforts at reconciliation had failed: the parties had not lived as husband and wife since January 2021, attempts by family and church to resolve their differences had failed, and a rift had developed between the two families, evident in the respondent's family's refusal to accord the petitioner's family customary rites of gratitude following a funeral. The Court also took note of photographic evidence showing the respondent moving out of the matrimonial home while the suit was pending.

The Court observed that where parties have been married for a lengthy period and have children together, an inquiry into the breakdown of a marriage should, where possible, rest on common ground that apportions no blame, both for the parties' future co-parenting relationship and for the wider good of society. Finding the marriage to have become, in its words, an empty legal shell existing only on paper, the Court decreed its dissolution and ordered the cancellation of the marriage certificate.

Mortgage, Custody and Maintenance Claims Dismissed

The Court declined to make any order regarding the mortgaged property, finding that although the petitioner had pleaded for half of it and an eventual equal share, no evidence was led on how the mortgage arose, who the mortgagor and mortgagee were, or the terms of the facility. Applying the established principle that a relief pleaded but unsupported by evidence is deemed abandoned, the Court treated those claims as abandoned.

On custody and maintenance, the Court reiterated that the welfare principle under section 2 of the Children's Act, 1998 (Act 560), governs every decision concerning a child, requiring consideration of factors such as the child's own views, continuity of care, and the practical realities of schooling and daily life. The Court found the evidence before it wholly inadequate for such an assessment: there was no indication of which parent the 14-year-old currently lived with, no view from the child himself, and no specifics on the nature or extent of the expenses the petitioner claimed to bear alone. The Court further noted that the petitioner had testified to doubting his own paternity of the child based on statements and conduct attributed to the respondent, yet had taken no apparent steps to resolve that uncertainty before asking the court to make custody and maintenance orders. On this basis, the claims for shared custody and equal maintenance were dismissed, with no order as to costs.

Observations on Service at a Changed Address

The Court devoted significant attention to an irregularity in how later court processes were served on the respondent. Although the original petition, the order granting leave to serve outside the jurisdiction, and the notice to set the matter down for trial had all been properly served at the address specified in the petition and earlier court orders, the petitioner later served a witness statement, a supplementary witness statement, and accompanying court notes at a different address in the United States, without seeking the court's leave or notifying it of the change.

The Court held that an address for service is not a mere procedural formality but a safeguard rooted in the right to fair hearing, ensuring a party knows where and how they may be called to account. Drawing on both Ghanaian authority and the English case of Abela v Baadarani, the Court found that a party may not unilaterally depart from a court-sanctioned address merely on the belief that the other party has relocated, and that such a change should properly be sanctioned by the court. Nevertheless, because the core originating processes had already been validly served at the correct address before the respondent chose not to respond, the Court held that the later irregular service, although improper, was not so fundamental as to vitiate the proceedings as a whole, since the respondent had already been given adequate notice and had, by her inaction, forfeited her right to be heard.

Decision

The Court granted the decree of dissolution and ordered cancellation of the parties' marriage certificate, while dismissing the petitioner's claims relating to the mortgaged property, shared custody, and equal maintenance of the child for want of sufficient evidence. There was no order as to costs.

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