Applicants' Arguments

Counsel for the applicants argued that the destruction of two separate "For Sale" banners, the WhatsApp message, the "Not For Sale" inscription, and the harassment of prospective purchasers were not passive misunderstandings but repeated, deliberate acts of disobedience, some of which the second respondent openly admitted and justified in his own affidavit. Counsel further argued that the first and second respondents were acting in concert, pointing to the second respondent's use of the word "us" in describing the decision to post the "Not For Sale" notice, and to portions of the first respondent's affidavit said to reveal her motive for resisting the sale.

Respondents' Arguments

Counsel for the first respondent argued that contempt, being quasi-criminal, required proof beyond reasonable doubt, and that no evidence linked her personally to the banner destruction or the "Not For Sale" inscription, noting that Ghanaian law does not recognise motive as a substitute for proof of an actual criminal act, and that one respondent's self-incriminating statements could not be used as evidence against the other.

Counsel for the second respondent argued that the Circuit Court's order never granted the applicants unilateral authority to sell the property, that the "Not For Sale" notice was posted to warn off fraudulent strangers rather than to defy the court, that he had since removed the inscription, and relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Republic v. High Court, Accra; Ex parte Laryea Mensah [1998-99] SCGLR 360, that a contempt order must be unambiguous, which this one was not. He also noted that the Circuit Court had, by the time of the hearing, vacated its original sale order in favour of a straightforward distribution among the beneficiaries.

Court's Findings

The Court held that although all counsel agreed the first two elements of contempt, the existence of an order, and the parties' awareness of it, were not in dispute, none had addressed the Court on whether the order was itself clear enough to be enforced, an issue the Court held it was bound to examine regardless of whether it had been argued. Scrutinising the Circuit Court's order, the Court found that while the direction for AESL to gather and value the estate was clear, the order was silent on who was actually responsible for carrying out the sale itself. That silence permitted at least three plausible readings: that AESL was to sell the property itself, that the applicants (as the party who had sought the order) were to arrange the sale, or that the process was to be supervised by the Court. The Court noted that the actual conduct of the parties reflected this very confusion, AESL took no further action after submitting its valuation, the applicants appointed their own auctioneer, and the Circuit Court's own chief bailiff independently hoisted a "For Sale" banner, each apparently operating on a different understanding of who bore responsibility.

Applying the principle from Ex parte Laryea Mensah that an order underlying a contempt application must be unambiguous and clearly understood by the parties, the Court held that this order failed that standard with respect to the question of who was to sell the property, even though it was clear as to valuation and distribution. Because the second element of contempt requires that the alleged contemnor knew precisely what act they were required to do or refrain from doing, and the order left genuine room to dispute whether the respondents were obliged not to interfere with a sale process the order did not clearly assign to the applicants, the Court found this element could not be satisfied either. Having found the first two elements unmet, the Court declined to proceed to consider whether the respondents' non-compliance was wilful, holding that doing so would not be a judicious use of judicial time, since all four elements of contempt must be established and none of the remaining analysis could cure the deficiency already found.

The Court was nonetheless candid that the second respondent's conduct, particularly his letter to counsel and his WhatsApp message vowing the house would never be sold, reflected a clear intention to prevent the sale, and observed that had the underlying order been clear, these acts might well have grounded a contempt finding. The Court also declined to draw any conclusions from video exhibits submitted by both sides, as they were recorded substantially in Ewe and had not been formally transcribed into English, the language of the court, and noted, without further comment, the coincidence that the respondents' application to set aside the sale order and the applicants' contempt application had been filed at different courts on the very same day.

Decision

The Court held that the application for contempt could not succeed, given the failure to establish that the underlying order clearly and unambiguously assigned responsibility for the sale, and dismissed the application in its entirety. Both respondents were acquitted and discharged, with no order as to costs. The Court closed by invoking the principle, drawn from Republic v. Mensa-Bonsu; Ex parte Attorney-General [1994-95] GBR 130, that the contempt power exists to protect the administration of justice as a whole and not to vindicate the grievances, however genuine, of any particular litigant.

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