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The Supreme Court in the July, 2026 case of ALBERT DIYUOH FAALONGBASOGLO v. THE REPUBLIC [TLP-SC-2026-24] has dismissed an appeal by a former bank branch manager convicted of stealing over GH¢119,000 from his employer, holding that a confession statement bearing his thumbprint rather than his usual signature was properly admitted into evidence.
The unanimous decision (a copy which may be read below) of the Supreme Court delivered in the voice of H/L Justice H. Kwofie with a concurrence from Justice Ackaah-Boafo clarifies that a challenge to a confession's voluntariness must be raised as an objection when the document is tendered, and that the mere use of a thumbprint in place of a signature does not, without more, render a confession involuntary or inadmissible.
Background
The appellant, Albert Diyuoh Faalongbasoglo, was the Branch Manager of the Hamile Branch of GN Bank when a cash count conducted by the bank's Regional Operations Manager revealed a shortfall in the branch's accounts. Successive cash counts recorded increasing shortfalls, eventually reaching GH¢149,100.00, the amount later reflected in the charge sheet.
During investigations, the appellant made a cautioned statement, Exhibit J, in which he admitted appropriating a sum of money, attributing part of the shortfall to a subordinate who had allegedly absconded with funds while the appellant was a branch manager at Tumu. He also signed a Letter of Undertaking, Exhibit G, accepting responsibility for the sums missing from the Hamile branch and proposing a repayment schedule.
The trial High Court convicted the appellant of stealing GH¢119,525.00 and sentenced him to eighteen months' imprisonment with hard labour, together with an order to refund GH¢83,025.00. The Court of Appeal, Kumasi, affirmed the conviction. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing, among other things, that his confession statements had been obtained under duress and ought not to have been admitted without the trial court first conducting a mini-trial (voir dire) into their voluntariness.
Appellant's Arguments
Counsel for the appellant submitted that Exhibits G and J were involuntary confessions inadmissible under section 120 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323), which excludes statements induced by cruel or inhuman treatment, threats, or promises held out by a person in authority.
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On Exhibit J specifically, counsel pointed to its unusual phrasing, which referred to the appellant in the third person before switching to direct address, and argued this showed the statement had been scripted by the investigator rather than given voluntarily by the appellant. Counsel further submitted that the appellant's thumbprint, rather than his customary signature, appeared on the document, and argued this was evidence that the thumbprint had been procured under coercion and that the appellant had not read the statement before it was affixed. Counsel argued that once these concerns were raised at trial, the court was obliged to conduct a mini-trial to test voluntariness, relying on Frimpong alias Iboman v. The Republic [2012] 1 SCGLR 297.
Respondent's Arguments
The Republic accepted that Exhibits G and J were confessions but maintained that the statutory requirements for admissibility were satisfied. On Exhibit J, the Republic pointed out that the statement was taken while the appellant was under arrest but was made in the presence of an independent witness who certified that it had been given voluntarily and understood by the appellant, satisfying section 120(2) of the Evidence Act. It was further submitted that the appellant did not object to the tendering of Exhibit J at trial and did not cross-examine the relevant witness on any allegation of coercion at that time, raising the issue only later, during his own testimony, making the allegation an afterthought.
Court's Findings
Justice Ackaah-Boafo in his commendably elaborate concurrence explained that a mini-trial or voir dire on voluntariness is triggered by a timely objection when a confession is tendered in evidence; where no such objection is raised, the statement may be admitted, with any concerns going to its weight rather than its admissibility. The record showed that the appellant did not object to Exhibit J on grounds of duress when it was tendered, and only raised the allegation later, during his own defence.
On the specific complaint that Exhibit J bore a thumbprint rather than the appellant's usual signature, the Court found this fact alone insufficient to undermine the confession. Since the appellant never denied that the thumbprint was his, its mere presence in place of a signature did not, by itself, negate the voluntariness of the statement. The Court observed that permitting a thumbprint to invalidate a confession simply because the accused ordinarily signed documents would allow "a resourceful accused person" to sign one document and thumbprint another, and later challenge both on that basis alone, a result the law does not support. What mattered instead was whether the prosecution had shown that the mark was genuinely the accused's and that the document was voluntarily executed, which the Court found had been established.
The Court also noted that Exhibit J had been made in the presence of an independent witness who certified it as required by section 120(2) of the Evidence Act, and that Exhibit G, the separate Letter of Undertaking, had been prepared with the assistance of the appellant's own witness at a time when the appellant was not in custody, circumstances the Court found inconsistent with coercion.
The Court further held that, even assuming some irregularity in how the confessions were handled, no substantial miscarriage of justice had resulted, since the confessions were not the sole basis of conviction; they were corroborated by cash-count records, a supervisory report, and the appellant's own explanations under query.
In a comprehensive observation on practice, Justice Ackaah-Boafo suggested that, with advancing technology, investigators could reduce future disputes over confession statements by audio- or video-recording confessions with the consent of the accused, to enhance transparency and reliability in the process.
Decision
The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeal had correctly treated Exhibits G and J as admissible confessions, correctly found that the appellant had failed to establish duress, and correctly concluded that the absence of a mini-trial did not occasion a miscarriage of justice in the circumstances. The appeal was dismissed in its entirety, and the conviction and sentence were affirmed.
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