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The Court of Appeal in the case of UNIQUE FURNISHING LIMITED v. HOLMAN BROTHERS LIMITED [TLP-CA-2026-43] has set aside a High Court judgment dismissing a company’s claim to land at Alajo, Accra, after finding that the trial judge had, in an earlier career as Chief Registrar of Lands, personally signed the land title certificate she went on to declare fraudulent, a conflict of interest the appellate court held was serious enough to invalidate the entire trial.
The decision, delivered by Justice Dr. Osei-Hwere with Justices Mensah-Homiah and Myers Ahmed concurring, did not determine who is entitled to the disputed 2.68-acre parcel, ordering instead that the case be heard afresh before a differently constituted High Court.
Background
Unique Furnishing Limited sued Holman Brothers Limited in 2006, claiming that Holman Brothers had forcibly entered and remained on part of land at Alajo which Unique Furnishing held under a 41-year lease from the Lands Commission, registered under Land Title Certificate No. GA 30098. Unique Furnishing sought a declaration of title, an order ejecting Holman Brothers, damages for trespass, and a perpetual injunction.
At trial, the High Court (Lands Division) dismissed Unique Furnishing’s claims and entered judgment for Holman Brothers.
The trial judge went further, holding that Unique Furnishing’s own lease and land certificate had been procured by fraud, and ordered the Lands Commission, which was not a party to the suit, to cancel and amend its records accordingly. It later emerged that the land certificate the judge invalidated had been signed by the judge herself years earlier, while she served as Chief Registrar of Lands.
Unique Furnishing appealed, relying solely on the omnibus ground that the judgment was against the weight of the evidence; a further ground of appeal was never filed and was struck out.
Appellant’s Arguments
Unique Furnishing argued that the trial judge’s prior role in issuing the land certificate she later annulled gave rise to a real likelihood of bias, and that this conflict of interest went to the fairness of the entire trial. Counsel submitted that the judge’s finding of fraud against the company, based on conduct said to have occurred while she worked at the Lands Commission, offended the basic rule that a judge must remain neutral and recuse herself from any matter in which she has a conflict of interest, particularly where she is effectively giving evidence in her own cause against a party who had no opportunity to examine her.
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4th Apr, 2026
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Respondent’s Arguments
The judgment does not record a substantive answer from Holman Brothers to the recusal point; the respondent’s position at trial was that Unique Furnishing’s title was itself invalid and that Holman Brothers was lawfully in possession of the disputed land.
Court’s Findings
The Court of Appeal first addressed whether a conflict-of-interest argument could be raised at all under an omnibus ground confined, on older authority, to factual re-evaluation. Tracing the Supreme Court’s evolving position through Tuakwa v. Bosom, Brown v. Quashigah, Owusu-Domena v. Amoah, and Atuguba & Associates v. Scipion Capital (UK) Ltd, the Court held that points of law may properly be argued under the omnibus ground where the weight of the evidence is substantially influenced by a legal question, including, as here, whether the tribunal itself was properly constituted. On that basis, the conflict-of-interest issue was properly before the Court.
Turning to the merits, the Court applied the “real likelihood of bias” standard from Republic v. High Court, Kumasi; Ex parte Mobil Oil (Ghana) Ltd and the “fair-minded and informed observer” test drawn from In re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No. 2). It found the case closely analogous to the US Supreme Court’s decision in Williams v. Pennsylvania, where a judge who, as a former prosecutor, had approved pursuing the death penalty against a defendant was later disqualified from hearing that same defendant’s post-conviction appeal. The Court also cited Fisher v. University of Texas, in which Justice Kagan recused herself from a matter she had worked on as US Solicitor General, and the Ghanaian Supreme Court’s recent decision in Republic v. Court of Appeal, Ex parte Klenam Construction Limited, disqualifying a panel member who had previously adjudicated a related matter as a High Court judge.
The Court held that although there was no evidence of any personal or financial interest on the trial judge’s part, her prior, direct professional involvement in issuing the very certificate she subsequently annulled was itself sufficient to disqualify her. It held that the judge ought to have recused herself of her own accord once she recognised her earlier role in the matter, and that her failure to do so meant her foreknowledge of the facts made it impossible for her to act as a neutral arbiter.
Decision
The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge’s failure to recuse herself amounted to a breach of the constitutional right to a fair hearing under Article 19 of the 1992 Constitution, an error not curable by appellate reassessment of the merits. The appeal was allowed, the High Court’s judgment of 29th July 2022 was set aside, and the Court ordered that the case be retried before a differently constituted High Court.
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